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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
WESTERN DIVISION 
No. 5:11-CV-388-BR









This matter is before the court on the 25 August 2011 motion to dismiss filed by
defendant Cumberland County (“County”). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Alvin L. Bess (“plaintiff’) was employed by the County as a transportation 
planner and as a Fayetteville Area Metropolitan Planning Organization (“FAMPO”) principal 
transit planner from 3 March 2008 until his termination on 12 March 2010. (Compl., DE # 4, at 
12, 18;1 Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, DE # 12, at 2-3.) Plaintiff filed two charges of 
employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on 
26 January 2010 and 19 May 2010. (Compl., DE # 4, at 5, 8, 14, 21.) Plaintiff subsequently 
filed two separate lawsuits relating to these charges of discrimination. Plaintiff’ s first action,
No. 5:10-CV-453-BR, which the court will discuss further in Section II.F., infra, was filed in this
1 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action consists of two documents, a fill-in-the-blank typewritten complaint 
that the court makes available for use by pro se litigants, and a separate complaint that plaintiff composed entirely on 
his own. These two documents were filed as a single entry on the docket. (See DE # 4.) Therefore, in order to 
avoid confusion when citing to the complaint, the court will not refer to the page numbers used by plaintiff in the 
separate documents but will instead refer to the page numbers that were electronically generated by the Clerk’s 
office when the documents were filed together as a single docket entry.
district on 20 October 2010. Plaintiff commenced the current action on 25 July 2011. In this 
action, he asserts claims against the County under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq .; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiff also appears to be asserting numerous state law claims against the 
County, including but not limited to “fraud, slander, defamation, conspiracy, collusion, 
misconduct, malice, and willful and wanton conduct . . . .” (Compl., DE # 4, at 10.)
On 25 August 2011, the County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff filed a 
response on 2 September 2011. The County did not file a reply.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The County first argues that plaintiff’ s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
Before a plaintiff may file suit under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, he is required to file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, including 
exhaustion requirement); Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009); Davis v. 
Va. Commonwealth Univ., 180 F.3d 626, 628 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999). “Th[is] exhaustion 
requirement ensures that the employer is put on notice of the alleged violations so that the matter 
can be resolved out of court if  possible.” Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005). 
Importantly, a failure by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies concerning a 
discrimination claim deprives the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
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See Jones, 551 F.3d at 300.
The scope of a plaintiff’ s right to file a federal lawsuit under Title VII, the ADA, or the 
ADEA is determined by the contents of the EEOC charge. Id. Only those discrimination claims 
stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the initial charge, and those developed by 
reasonable investigation of the initial charge may be maintained in a subsequent civil action. Id.; 
see also Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, the County argues that “plaintiff has made no effort to demonstrate that he has 
fulfilled the exhaustion prerequisite” because he “has not identified, by pleading or otherwise, 
the specific charges filed with the EEOC.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, DE # 12, at 6.) 
However, as the County admits (see id.), plaintiff has attached a right-to-sue letter to his 
complaint (see DE # 4-3). He has also alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(Compl., DE # 4, at 5, 9, 11, 21.) In the court’s view, at this stage of the proceedings, plaintiff 
has sufficiently demonstrated satisfaction of the procedural prerequisites for filing suit under the 
relevant statutes. See Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th Cir. 1995) (“We have 
long held that receipt of, or at least entitlement to, a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite that must be alleged in a plaintiffs complaint.”). Thus, the court will not dismiss the 
complaint at this time for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. However, the County may 
raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction again at the summary judgment stage, when both 
parties will have an opportunity to submit copies of any documents relating to the specific 
charges that plaintiff filed with the EEOC.
B. Title VII Race Claims
In this case, plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII for “retaliatory discrimination,
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harassment discrimination, [and] race and color discrimination.” (Compl., DE # 4, at 10.) The
County moves to dismiss these claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of a complaint” but “does not 
resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” 
Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In order to survive a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 
1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In evaluating 
whether a claim is stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” 
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com. Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). A court 
need not accept as true “‘unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.’” Id. 
(quoting Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1140 (2010)).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less 
stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 
(1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to 
allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 
582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharging] any individual, or otherwise . . .
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discriminating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prim afacie  case of discrimination under Title VII are: 
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment 
action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. 
See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying these elements 
in the Rule 12(b)(6) context), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3059 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1016); 
White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).
The County argues that plaintiff’ s race discrimination claim should be dismissed because 
plaintiff “has not pled that his job performance was satisfactory.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Dismiss, DE # 12, at 7.) As previously stated, the court has a duty to construe pro se complaints 
liberally. It is true that plaintiff does not intone the magic words “my job performance was 
satisfactory” in the complaint. But he need not, as long as satisfactory job performance can be 
inferred from the allegations that he does make. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 
231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (all reasonable factual inferences from the allegations in the complaint 
must be drawn in the plaintiff’ s favor). Here, plaintiff alleges that he was given an 
“unsubstantiated” poor performance appraisal. (Compl., DE # 4, at 13, 14.) Plaintiff also alleges 
that the County discharged him for “unsubstantiated” charges of insubordination, misconduct, 
and unacceptable personal conduct. (Id. at 18; see also id. at 8 (“Plaintiff was discharged, 
without just cause, for insubordination, misconduct, and unacceptable personal conduct,” and 
“[p]laintiff was labeled, ‘angry, violent, frustrated, and emotional,’ without just cause”).) Taken 
together, these allegations support the inference that plaintiff is disputing the County’s proffered
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reasons for terminating him and that plaintiff was performing his job in a satisfactory manner at 
all times relevant to this action. Thus, the court finds the County’s argument with respect to this 
issue to be without merit.
The County also argues that plaintiff alleges no facts to demonstrate that he was treated 
differently than similarly situated employees outside his protected class. The court rejects this 
contention and finds that the County has ignored several of plaintiff’ s allegations relating to 
disparate treatment. Plaintiff, who is African-American, asserts that he was discriminated 
against on the basis of his race in the assignment of job responsibilities.2 Specifically, he 
maintains that he was “excluded” from “FAMPO/Section planning work.” (Compl., DE # 4, at 
13; see also id. at 8 (plaintiff was given a “departmental” project, but not a “section” project).) 
He also expressly names other employees outside of the protected class who were “treated 
favorably” by his supervisor, Mr. Richard Heickson (“Heickson”). (Id. at 13.) Among other 
things, plaintiff alleges that these employees were assigned “a steady supply of professional 
FAMPO/Section planning work” and that they were allowed “to attend regularly scheduled 
meetings and speak publicly.” (Id.) Although these allegations are minimal, they are sufficient 
to demonstrate that plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside the 
protected class. As a result, plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with his race discrimination 
claim.
Plaintiff also appears to allege that the County subjected him to a hostile work
2
The court notes that it is possible for the reassignment of job duties to constitute an adverse employment 
action “if the plaintiff can show that the reassignment had some significant detrimental effect” such as a “decrease in 
compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion[.]” James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 
Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Webster v. Rumsfeld, 156 Fed. Appx. 571, 579 (4th Cir. 2005). In this case, plaintiff has set forth sufficient 
allegations regarding the significant change in his level of responsibility to survive the motion to dismiss.
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environment based on his race. (See Compl., DE # 4, at 10.) To establish such a claim, plaintiff 
must demonstrate that: (1) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was 
based on his race; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions 
of his employment and to create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) some factual basis exists to 
impute liability for the harassment to the employer. See, e.g., Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 
745-46 (4th Cir. 2006); McDougal-Wilson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 595, 
612 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
With respect to the first element of this claim, plaintiff appears to rely in part on the same 
allegations that he makes with respect to his disparate treatment claim, see discussion, supra, at 
6. In other words, he claims that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment in part because he 
was excluded from FAMPO projects. However, “alleged acts of disparate treatment cannot be 
transformed, without more, into a hostile work environment claim.” Kilby-Robb v. Spellings, 
522 F. Supp. 2d 148, 164 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 309 Fed. Appx. 422 (D C. Cir. 2009); see also 
Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2003); Parker v. State, Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 11 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (D. Del. 1998) (“ [T]he dangers of allowing standard disparate 
treatment claims to be converted into a contemporaneous hostile work environment claim are 
apparent. Such an action would significantly blur the distinctions between both the elements that 
underpin each cause of action and the kinds of harm each cause of action was designed to 
address.”).
Plaintiff further appears to rely on several incidents that are unconnected to his disparate 
treatment claim. First, he alleges that his supervisor, Heicksen, gave him an unsubstantiated 
poor performance evaluation on 31 July 2009. (Compl., DE # 4, at 13.) He also alleges that he
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was “bullied” by the County’s Planning and Inspections Department Director, Tomas Lloyd 
(“Lloyd”), who falsely accused him of sexual harassment and workplace violence. (Id. at 14.)
In addition, on 2 March 2010, a few days prior to plaintiff’ s termination, Assistant County 
Manager and Human Resources Manager James Lawson (“Lawson”) allegedly labeled plaintiff 
as “‘violent, angry, emotional, and frustrated’” in front of Lawson’s two assistants. (Id. at 16.) 
Finally, on 3 March 2010, plaintiff received a letter from County Manager James Martin 
(“Martin”) which stated that plaintiff was “‘experiencing frustration’” and that plaintiff “‘may 
react with violence.’” (Id. at 17.)
While plaintiff’ s allegations that he was falsely accused of sexual harassment and 
workplace violence are serious, he fails to allege any facts that would plausibly suggest the 
necessary connection between the events he finds abusive and his membership in a protected 
class. See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997) (“We have made 
clear that only harassment that occurs because of the victim’s [protected status] is actionable. . . . 
We have further explained that ‘[a]n employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against 
‘because of’ his or her [status] if, ‘but-for’ the employee’s [status], he or she would not have 
been the victim of the discrimination.’” (citation omitted)). Here, plaintiff pleads his own race as 
well as the race of his supervisors and coworkers, without any suggestion of how he was 
discriminated against because of his protected status as opposed to any other, non-discriminatory 
reason. The plausibility of a nexus linking the alleged abusive events to his race is especially 
weak given the fact that one of the incidents plaintiff relies on involves treatment he received 
from Lawson, who is also African-American. (See Compl., DE # 4, at 3, 12.) As a result, 
plaintiff’ s Title VII hostile work environment claim will be dismissed.
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Plaintiff also asserts a Title VII race retaliation claim with respect to the events leading 
up to and including the termination of his employment. Title VII’s prohibition on retaliation 
states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The elements of aprim afacie  retaliation claim under Title VII are: (1) 
engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between 
the protected activity and the employment action. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (applying these 
elements in the Rule 12(b)(6) context); Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004); 
McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1991).
The County appears to concede that the first two elements of this claim have been 
satisfactorily pled. (See D e f’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, DE # 12, at 8-9.) The County argues 
that plaintiff has failed to make sufficient allegations regarding the third element of his prima 
facie  case, that is, to allege adequate facts to demonstrate a causal connection between his 
discharge and the protected expression. Because of this deficiency, the County maintains that 
plaintiff’ s retaliation claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. However, “under Fourth Circuit law, very little proof is required to establish the 
causal link in a retaliation case; in fact, in many instances, the connection is inferred from the 
mere act of termination . . . .” Barbier v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 2d 617, 627 
(M.D.N.C. 2002); see also McNairn, 929 F.2d at 980 (stating, in reference to the causal 
connection element of a retaliation case, that “it can be inferred that the termination was
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triggered by the [protected activity]”); Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1229
(4th Cir. 1998) (“Although Karpel presents little or no direct evidence of a causal connection 
between her protected activity and Inova’s adverse action, little is required.”).
The essence of the arguments made by the County with respect to this issue is that the 
County had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging plaintiff. (See Def.’s Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, DE # 12, at 8-9.) While this may be the appropriate analysis at the 
summary judgment stage of the litigation, the purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the 
sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve contests surrounding the facts or to decide the merits. 
Republican Party, 980 F.2d at 952.
Furthermore, the court disagrees with the County’s assertion that plaintiff’ s own 
allegations substantiate the lack of a causal link. It is apparent that plaintiff details the County’s 
interpretation of certain relevant events in his complaint not because he agrees with the County’s 
position, but because he intends to show that the County’s proffered reasons for terminating him 
were pretext for retaliation. At a minimum, plaintiff clearly pleads that he complained about 
racial discrimination in a detailed email to his immediate supervisor on 6 January 2010 (Compl., 
DE # 4, at 8), that he filed a complaint with the EEOC on 26 January 2010 (id.), and that he “was 
hurriedly discharged for misconduct” on 12 March 2010 (id. at 9). The temporal proximity of 
these events is sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection between the protected activity and 
the adverse action. See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 
657 (4th Cir. 1998) (“This Court has held that evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred 
shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to ‘satisf[y] the 
less onerous burden of making a prima facie case of causa[tion].’” (citation omitted) (emphasis
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and alterations in original)). At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the court finds that plaintiff has pled 
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Accordingly, plaintiff will be allowed to 
proceed with his Title VII race retaliation claim.
C. ADA Claims
The court construes plaintiff’ s complaint as attempting to raise several claims under the
ADA. The court will first address plaintiff’ s discrimination and hostile work environment
claims. The ADA provides in relevant part:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To avail himself of the protections of the ADA, plaintiff must first 
demonstrate that he suffers from a disability. See id.; Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 
177 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting outprim afacie  elements of ADA hostile work environment claim); 
EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000) (setting out prima facie 
elements of ADA disability discrimination claim); Williams v. Brunswick Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
725 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (same), aff’d, — F.3d — , No. 10-1884, 2011 WL 
2938073 (4th Cir. July 22, 2011). The ADA defines “disability” with respect to an individual as 
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).3 In this case, it is unclear whether plaintiff is claiming
3The current version of the ADA incorporates the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The ADAAA, which became effective on 1 January 2009, id. at 3559, applies 
to this case. In the ADAAA, Congress mandated that the definition of disability is to be construed “in favor of broad
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that he has an actual disability or that the County perceived him as being disabled. As a result, 
the court will consider both possible claims.
The only allegation that the court could find in plaintiff’ s complaint relating to an actual 
disability is that plaintiff “is a Black male who happens to stutter.” (Compl., DE # 4, at 12.) 
Even if the court assumes that plaintiff’ s stuttering is a “physical impairment” under 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)(A), the complaint contains no allegations which demonstrate that plaintiff’ s stutter 
substantially limited any major life activity, such as working or communicating. See Bates v. 
Wis.-Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 636 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (speech impediment 
which allegedly caused plaintiff to stutter did not qualify as disability under the ADA, given 
complete lack of evidence that plaintiff’ s stuttering substantially limited any major life activity), 
aff’d, 375 Fed. Appx. 633 (7th Cir. 2010). In fact, plaintiff’ s own allegations indicate that his 
physical condition did not limit his ability to work or communicate. (See, e.g., Compl., DE # 4, 
at 12 (plaintiff states that he is “highly-experienced and highly-educated”).) Thus, plaintiff has 
alleged no facts from which the court can conclude that he has the requisite disability to qualify 
him for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
The court will now consider whether plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that he 
was “regarded as” having a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). “An individual meets the 
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if  the individual establishes that 
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted” by the law. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). The court has 
taken the broad coverage of the ADAAA into account in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
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limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Here, the only allegation that the court
could find relating to this issue is that on 5 March 2010, County Manager Martin, “wrote about
Mr. Bess’ disability.” (Compl., DE # 4, at 15.) Other than this vague allegation, there are
simply no facts in the complaint which show that any of the relevant decision makers in this case
regarded plaintiff as having an actual or perceived impairment or that any of the decision makers
subjected him to action that is unlawful under the ADA because of such an impairment. As a
result, plaintiff cannot establish that a disability existed under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
Accordingly, even under the most liberal pleading standard, plaintiff has failed to state a
discrimination or hostile work environment claim under the ADA.4
The court also construes plaintiff’ s complaint as attempting to raise a retaliation claim
under the ADA. “Title V of the ADA governs claims for retaliation.” Shepard v. Irving, 77 Fed.
Appx. 615, 622 (4th Cir. 2003). Title V states in pertinent part:
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such 
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). By its plain language, this provision of the ADA does not require that the
claimant be disabled. Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001). In order to establish a
prim afacie  case of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he engaged in conduct protected by
the ADA; (2) that he suffered an adverse action subsequent to engaging in the protected conduct;
and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.
4 To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for wrongful discharge under the ADA, this 
claim fails for the same reasons as plaintiff’s ADA discrimination and hostile work environment claims. See, e.g., 
Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995) (setting out prima facie elements of 
ADA wrongful discharge claim).
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Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 216 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying these
elements in the Rule 12(b)(6) context); Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 392.
Here, similar to his race retaliation claim, plaintiff clearly pleads that he complained 
about “disability discrimination” in a detailed email to his immediate supervisor on 6 January 
2010 (Compl., DE # 4, at 8), that he filed a complaint with the EEOC on 26 January 2010 (id.), 
and that he “was hurriedly discharged for misconduct” on 12 March 2010 (id. at 9). The 
temporal proximity of these events is sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse action. See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Thus, plaintiff will be 
permitted to proceed with his ADA retaliation claim.
D. ADEA Claim
Plaintiff also brings an age discrimination claim against the County. The ADEA 
provides that “all personnel actions affecting [certain federal] employees . . . who are at least 40 
years of age . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). 
Here, plaintiff’ s ADEA claim fails to meet the requisite pleading and plausibility requirements 
set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. Although plaintiff alleges that 
his job responsibilities were reassigned to other employees, some of whom are under 30 years of 
age and some of whom are over 40 years of age (Compl., DE # 4, at 13), he completely fails to 
make any allegations regarding his age or a birth date from which his age may be determined. 
Thus, the court agrees with the County’s argument that plaintiff has not pled “any facts to 
establish that he is within the class of employees protected by the ADEA.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. 
Mot. Dismiss, DE # 12, at 10.) As a result, plaintiff has failed to state an ADEA claim.
E. State Law Claims
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It appears that plaintiff is attempting to bring broad state law claims against the County 
for “fraud, slander, defamation, conspiracy, collusion, misconduct, malice, and willful and 
wanton conduct . . . .” (Compl., DE # 4, at 10.) Plaintiff also appears to assert state law claims 
for other “misconduct,” including unlawful employment practices, calumny, interference with 
state agency administration, and interference with state judicial administration. (Id. at 2.) 
However, with the exception of two possible incidents that will be discussed below, plaintiff 
fails to allege any specific facts in support of these claims. Rather, he merely makes conclusory 
allegations accusing County officials and employees of various types of misconduct. Thus, 
almost all of plaintiff’ s state law claims fall far short of the plausibility standard required by 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
Construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff appears to claim that he was defamed on 2 
March 2010 when Lawson labeled him as being “‘violent, angry, emotional, and frustrated’” 
(Compl., DE # 4, at 16) and that he was also defamed in a letter written to him by Martin on 3 
March 2010. Martin’s letter, which was composed in response to a written complaint from 
plaintiff dated 1 March 2010, stated that plaintiff’ s complaint gave rise to the concern that 
plaintiff was “experiencing frustration and may react with violence.” (Id. at 17.)
“The term defamation includes two distinct torts, libel and slander. In general, libel is 
written while slander is oral.” Tallent v. Blake, 291 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). “To 
be actionable, a defamatory statement must be false and must be communicated to a person or 
persons other than the person defamed.” Andrews v. Elliot, 426 S.E.2d 430, 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1993). Here, plaintiff makes no allegation that Martin’s 3 March 2010 letter was communicated 
to anyone other than plaintiff. Although plaintiff alleges that the letter was “hand-delivered by
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Mr. Lloyd” (Compl., DE # 4, at 17), there is no allegation that Lloyd actually read the letter, nor 
can the court infer that Lloyd read the letter based on the mere fact that he delivered it to 
plaintiff. As a result, the 3 March 2010 letter cannot be used to support a claim for defamation 
in this case.
The second statement that plaintiff sets forth in support of a defamation claim is that 
Lawson labeled him as being “‘violent, angry, emotional, and frustrated.’” (Compl., DE # 4, at 
16.) Lawson’s statement was communicated to someone other than plaintiff, as evidenced by 
plaintiff’ s allegation that the statement was made in front of Lawson’s two assistants. (Id.) The 
North Carolina courts recognize two actionable classes of oral defamation: slander per se and 
slander per quod. Specifically, slander per se is “‘an oral communication to a third party which 
amounts to (1) an accusation that the plaintiff committed a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) 
an allegation that impeaches the plaintiff in his trade, business, or profession; or (3) an 
imputation that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease.’” Losing v. Food Lion, LLC, 648 S.E.2d 
261, 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 898 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint fail to support a claim of slander per se.
Although Lawson labeled plaintiff as being “violent,” plaintiff does not allege that Lawson 
accused him of any crime at all, let alone one of moral turpitude. See, e.g., Dew v. State ex rel. 
N.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 488 S.E.2d 836, 837 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (crimes involving 
moral turpitude include “act[s] of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties 
that a man owes to his fellowman or to society in general”) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, 179 S.E.2d 319,
16
323 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (“[I]in order to be actionable per se a false statement must impute that 
a person is guilty of a punishable offense.”). Similarly, there is no allegation that Lawson stated 
or even implied that plaintiff had an infectious disease.
Furthermore, there are no allegations in the complaint that plaintiff was impeached in his 
trade, business, or profession. See Badame v. Lampke, 89 S.E.2d 466, 468 (N.C. 1955) (In order 
for defamatory statements to fall into this category, the statements “must touch the plaintiff in his 
special trade or occupation, and . . . must contain an imputation necessarily hurtful in its effect 
on his business. . . . To be actionable per se, they must be uttered of him in his business 
relation.”). Rather, Lawson’s statement about plaintiff is properly characterized as a “general 
reflection upon the plaintiff’ s character or qualities” and therefore is not actionable per se. 
Williams, 179 S.E.2d at 323 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Slander per quod is a spoken statement that is not defamatory on its face but with 
“‘extrinsic, explanatory facts’” causes injury. Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 574 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Badame, 89 S.E.2d at 467). “In such cases, ‘the injurious character of 
the words and some special damage must be pleaded and proved.’” Id. at 575 (quoting Beane v. 
Weiman Co., 168 S.E.2d 236, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969)); see also Stanford v. Owens, 265 
S.E.2d 617, 624 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (“ [S]pecial damages must be pleaded with sufficient 
particularity to put defendant on notice.”). In the context of defamation, it is insufficient to 
allege emotional or mental distress to prove special damages -  there must be showing of 
“‘pecuniary loss.’” Donovan, 442 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting Williams, 179 S.E.2d at 322).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for slander per quod, as he makes no allegation that he has 
suffered pecuniary loss as a result of Lawson’s statement other than general allegations that he
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should be compensated for “loss of savings” and “financial injuries.” (Compl., DE # 4, at 22.) 
Such broad allegations, which are contained in plaintiff’ s prayer for relief and therefore are not 
made in reference to any particular claim, are insufficient to sustain a claim for slander per quod.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss all of plaintiff’ s state law claims against the County 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
F. Consolidation of Plaintiff’ s Cases
As previously mentioned, plaintiff has filed another action in this district relating to his 
charges of discrimination, Bess v. County of Cumberland et al., No. 5:10-CV-453-BR. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that “ [i]f actions before the court involve a common 
question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2). 
While neither of the parties to this action have requested consolidation, “[d]istrict courts have the 
inherent authority to order consolidation sua sponte.” Plimpton v. Cooper, 141 F. Supp. 2d 573, 
575 (W.D.N.C.) (citing Pickle v. Char Lee Seafood, Inc., 174 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging authority although determining inappropriate under the facts), aff’d, 21 Fed. 
Appx. 159 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “district courts have broad discretion under [Rule]
42(a) to consolidate causes pending in the same district.” A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. 
Tidewater Constr. Co., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Cir. 1977). When exercising this discretion, 
district courts should “weigh the risk of prejudice and possible confusion versus the possibility 
of inconsistent adjudication of common factual and legal issues, the burden on the parties, 
witnesses, and judicial resources by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to try multiple 
suits versus a single suit, and the relative expense required for multiple suits versus a single 
suit.” In re Cree, Inc., Sec. Litis., 219 F.R.D. 369, 371 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (citing Arnold v.
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Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982)).
Here, the two cases in question clearly involve the same facts and common questions of 
law. The discrimination and retaliation claims alleged in both suits essentially arise from the 
same series of events and were perpetrated by the same individuals. See Harris v. L & L Wings, 
Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 981 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (where plaintiffs’ claims were “brought against the 
same defendant, relying on the same witnesses, alleging the same misconduct,” the standard for 
consolidation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) was “clearly” met). While there may 
be some slight differences in the claims and requests for relief in each case, there is no reason to 
expect that consolidation will result in any confusion, undue delay, or prejudice for either 
plaintiff or the County. Moreover, it is plain that consolidation serves the interests of judicial 
economy and will avoid the possibility of inconsistent rulings or judgments. Therefore, this case 
will be consolidated with No. 5:10-CV-453-BR.
The traditional rule, in place before Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) was adopted, 
provided that “consolidation . . . does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights 
of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Johnson v. 
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933). The language of Federal Rule of Procedure 
42(a) apparently permits consolidation either to merge the cases or to retain the separate 
character of the cases. The majority of courts subscribe to the traditional rule. See Schnabel v. 
Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002); 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2382 (3d ed. 2008). In this instance, the court will follow the traditional 
rule. If ultimately necessary, both cases will be tried together, but each suit will retain its 
separate character and separate judgments will be entered. Plaintiff’ s first-filed case, No. 5:10-
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CV-453-BR, will serve as the lead case.
Because the court is consolidating plaintiff’ s cases, the court is sua sponte reconsidering 
the order that it previously issued on the motion to dismiss filed by the County and the individual 
defendants in the lead case. See Bess v. County of Cumberland et al., No. 5:10-CV-453-BR, 
7/25/11 Order, DE # 18. The court is reconsidering the motion to dismiss only as it relates to 
plaintiff’ s state law claims against the County and the individual defendants. The court 
originally denied the motion to dismiss the state law claims because the County and the 
individual defendants focused exclusively on the issue of whether the court should exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See id., slip. op. at 16-17. Now, for the 
same reasons that the court is dismissing the state law claims against the County in this action, 
see Section II.E., supra, the court concludes that plaintiff cannot maintain any of his state law 
claims against the County or the individual defendants in the lead case. As a result, the court 
will dismiss plaintiff’ s state law claims in the lead case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (the 
in form a pauperis statute, which plaintiff is proceeding under, requires a district court to dismiss 
a case if, at any time, it finds that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted). The individual defendants in the lead case will also be dismissed, as the state law 
claims were the only claims remaining against those defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and 
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’ s Title VII hostile work environment claim, ADA discrimination 
claim, ADA hostile work environment claim, ADEA claim, and all of his state law claims 
are DISMISSED. Because the court is consolidating plaintiff’ s cases, the Clerk is DIRECTED
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to adminstratively close the file with respect to the second-filed action docketed as No. 5:11-CV- 
388-BR. However, the complaint filed in the second action, No. 5:11-CV-388-BR, shall be 
docketed in the first matter, No. 5:10-CV-453-BR, as a supplemental complaint. The allegations 
contained in the supplemental complaint are hereby INCORPORATED into the lead case’s 
complaint, No. 5:10-CV-453-BR, DE # 5.
The Clerk is also DIRECTED to file this order in the lead case. The state law claims in 
the lead case are hereby DISMISSED. The individual defendants, James Martin, James Lawson, 
Tomas Lloyd, and Richard Heickson are also DISMISSED from the lead case.
All future filings shall be filed under the lead case, No. 5:10-CV-453-BR. The parties 
shall make no further filings in the second-filed action, No. 5-11-CV-388, unless directed to do 
so by the court. Going forward, the only surviving claims are plaintiff’ s claims against the 
County for race discrimination (i.e., disparate treatment) under Title VII, race retaliation under 
Title VII, and disability retaliation under the ADA.
This 10 October 2011.
W. Earl Britt
Senior U.S. District Judge
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